A largely qualitative body of literature has contributed to understanding the contradictory dimensions of community gardening as a social justice tool. Building on this literature through a city-wide, quantitative intervention, this paper focuses on community gardening as a facilitator of ecological gentrification in St. Louis, Missouri. Combining the analytical lenses of spatial justice, urban political ecology, and the rent gap theory of gentrification, I deploy spatial regression analysis to show that community gardening was positively associated with gentrification in St. Louis (...) between the years 2000 and 2010, as measured by the growth of high socioeconomic status residents in each neighborhood. This result suggests that a sociospatial dialectic exists in which the implementation of a community garden, a change in the use of urban space, leads to unintended social outcomes. Contextualizing this finding within the broader literature, I conclude that the potential of community gardening as an instrument for spatial justice is contingent on institutional support against larger-scale processes, like gentrification, that lead to spatially unjust outcomes. (shrink)

Transoral laser microsurgery applies to the piecemeal removal of malignant tumours of the upper aerodigestive tract using the CO2 laser under the operating microscope. This method of surgery is being increasingly popularised as a single modality treatment of choice in early laryngeal cancers (T1 and T2) and occasionally in the more advanced forms of the disease (T3 and T4), predomi- nantly within the supraglottis. Thomas Kuhn, the American physicist turned philosopher and historian of science, coined the phrase ‘paradigm shift’ in (...) his groundbreaking book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He argued that the arrival of the new and often incompatible idea forms the core of a new paradigm, the birth of an entirely new way of thinking. This article discusses whether Steiner and col- leagues truly brought about a paradigm shift in oncological surgery. By rejecting the principle of en block resection and by replacing it with the belief that not only is it oncologically safe to cut through the substance of the tumour but in doing so one can actually achieve better results, Steiner was able to truly revolutionise the man- agement of laryngeal cancer. Even though within this article the repercussions of his insight are limited to the upper aerodigestive tract oncological surgery, his willingness to question other peoples’ dogma makes his contribution truly a genuine paradigm shift. (shrink)

Ethical guidance from the British Medical Association about treating doctor–patients is compared and contrasted with evidence from a qualitative study of general practitioners who have been patients. Semistructured interviews were conducted with 17 GPs who had experienced a significant illness. Their experiences were discussed and issues about both being and treating doctor–patients were revealed. Interpretative phenomenological analysis was used to evaluate the data. In this article data extracts are used to illustrate and discuss three key points that summarise the BMA (...) ethical guidance, in order to develop a picture of how far experiences map onto guidance. The data illustrate and extend the complexities of the issues outlined by the BMA document. In particular, differences between experienced GPs and those who have recently completed their training are identified. This analysis will be useful for medical professionals both when they themselves are unwell and when they treat doctor–patients. It will also inform recommendations for professionals who educate medical students or trainees. (shrink)

Acute exercise consistently benefits both emotion and cognition, particularly cognitive control. We evaluated acute endurance exercise influences on emotion, domain-general cognitive control, and the cognitive control of emotion, specifically cognitive reappraisal. Thirty-six endurance runners, defined as running at least 30 miles per week with one weekly run of at least 9 miles (21 female, age 18-30 years) participated. In a repeated measures design, participants walked at 57% age-adjusted maximum heart rate (HRmax) (range 51-63%) and ran at 70% HRmax (range 64-76%) (...) for 90 minutes on two separate days. Participants completed measures of emotional state and the Stroop test of domain-general cognitive control before, every 30 minutes during, and 30 minutes after exercise. Participants also completed a cognitive reappraisal task after exercise. Functional near-infrared spectroscopy tracked changes in oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin levels in the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Endurance exercise elevated positive emotion and cognitive reappraisal success. Endurance exercise reduced Stroop response time and test-evoked PFC oxygenation during exercise. Results suggest that even at relatively moderate intensities, endurance athletes benefit emotionally from running both during and after exercise, and task-related prefrontal cortex oxygenation reductions do not appear to hinder prefrontal-dependent cognitive control. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

For the past three decades philosophical discussions of both personal autonomy and what it is for a person to “identify” with her desires have been dominated by the “hierarchical” analyses of these concepts developed by Gerald Dworkin and Harry Frankfurt. The longevity of these analyses is owed, in part, to the intuitive appeal of their shared claim that the concepts of autonomy and identification are to be analyzed in terms of hierarchies of desires, such that it is a necessary condition (...) for a person to be autonomous with respect to a desire that moves her to act, that she desires that this desire so move her. Despite the intuitive appeal of these analyses, however, Irving Thalberg has argued that they should be rejected. This is because, he argues, a person who is forced to perform an action by being subjected to duress of a certain degree of harshness will desire to be moved by her desire to submit. Thus, he continues, the proponents of hierarchical analyses of autonomy and identification will be forced to hold that such a person acted willingly, and did not suffer from any impairment in her autonomy. This, Thalberg concludes, is so counterintuitive as to justify rejecting hierarchical analyses. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Many find it intuitive that having been manipulated undermines a person's free will. Some have objected to accounts of free will like Harry Frankfurt's (according to which free will depends only on an agent's psychological structure at the time of action) by arguing that it is possible for manipulated agents, who are intuitively unfree, to satisfy Frankfurt's allegedly sufficient conditions for freedom. Drawing resources from Greg Egan's "Reasons to Be Cheerful" as well as from stories of psychologically sophisticated artificial intelligence (...) (such as Isaac Asimov's "The Bicentennial Man"), I rebut this objection to "structuralist" accounts of free will, arguing that the very possibility of free will for persons like us requires that we admit that a person can be free even when lacking control over the character from which she acts. I conclude with some implications for the freedom and personhood of artificial intelligences. (shrink)

First published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The New Atheists The New Atheists are authors of early twenty-first century books promoting atheism. These authors include Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Christopher Hitchens. The “New Atheist” label for these critics of religion and religious belief emerged out of journalistic commentary on the contents and impacts of their books. A standard observation is … Continue reading New Atheists →.

I argue against two of the most influential contemporary theories of moral responsibility: those of Harry Frankfurt and John Martin Fischer. Both propose conditions which are supposed to be sufficient for direct moral responsibility for actions. (By the term direct moral responsibility, I mean moral responsibility which is not traced from an earlier action.) Frankfurt proposes a condition of 'identification'; Fischer, writing with Mark Ravizza, proposes conditions for 'guidance control'. I argue, using counterexamples, that neither is sufficient for direct moral (...) responsibility. -/- My counterexample cases are based on recent research in psychology which reveals many surprising causes of our actions. Some of this research comes from the field of situationist social psychology; some from experiments which reveal the influence of automatic processes in our actions. Broadly, I call such causes 'subverting' when the agent would not identify with her action, if she knew all the causes of the action. When an action has subverting causes, the agent is not directly morally responsible for it, even though she may meet the conditions specified by Frankfurt and Fischer. -/- I also criticise the theories of Eddy Nahmias and John Doris, who have both engaged specifically with the threats posed to moral responsibility by situationist research. Against Doris and Nahmias, I argue that their conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for direct moral responsibility. -/- My final objective is to argue that there are many everyday actions for which we mistakenly hold agents morally responsible. I review evidence that there are many everyday actions which have subverting causes. Many of those are actions for which we currently hold agents morally responsible. But I argue that, in many of those same actions, the agents are not in fact morally responsible – they bear neither direct nor traced moral responsibility. (shrink)

_Lux: A Decade of Artists' Film and Video_ Edited by Steve Reinke and Tom Taylor Toronto: YYZ Books, 2000 ISBN 0-920397-26-3 373 pp.

For almost the past three decades the model of autonomy which has dominated philosophical discussion of this concept has been the "hierarchical" model, which has been independently developed and defended by Harry Frankfurt, Gerald Dworkin and John Christman, and which is primarily concerned with what makes a person autonomous with respect to her first-order desires. It is argued that all versions of the hierarchical model of personal autonomy are based upon a theoretical mistake, and so should be rejected. This mistake (...) is to focus upon the person's attitude towards the desire in question. Such attitude-based approaches will be mistaken because it is always possible to raise the question as to whether the person is autonomous with respect to this attitude itself. With this rejection of the hierarchical analyses of autonomy in hand it is argued that a person is autonomous with respect to her first-order desires to the extent that she has critically reflected upon the beliefs which lead her to have them. This belief-based approach to autonomy enjoys several advantages over its attitudebased rivals. It avoids all of the problems that are faced by the attitude-based models offered by Frankfurt et al., and it is also able to recognize a richer taxonomy of desire than they are. Moreover, this account of autonomy is not committed to either a Humean or an anti-Humean model of motivation. ;With the defense of the belief-based model of autonomy in hand, it is then applied to three distinct debates within applied ethics; social ethics , business ethics , and medical ethics' focus on the Principle of Respect for Autonomy. This part of the dissertation concludes by observing that in all three of these particular debates it is not autonomy that is of primary concern, but well-being, subjectively understood. (shrink)

Although the standard objections to Harry Frankfurt's early hierarchical analysis of identification and its variants are well known, more recent work on identification has yet to be subjected to the same degree of scrutiny. To remedy this I develop in this paper objections to Frankfurt's most recent analysis of identification as satisfaction that he first outlined in his paper ?The Faintest Passion?. With such objections in place I show that they demonstrate that Frankfurt's analysis fails because it is based on (...) the attitudes that the person whose identification with his desires is in question adopts towards them. I then develop a new (objective and cognitive) analysis that avoids the difficulties that Frankfurt's subjective approach is prey to. I conclude by considering and rebutting some preliminary objections to this new analysis. (shrink)

Discussions of non-racialism in South Africa and discussions of post-racialism in the United States are sufficiently similar to invite the question as to whether South African thinkers could help to develop new ways of thinking about post-racialism and its potential in the United States. Biko's ideas are rarely taken up in the United States, yet they are relevant to contemporary discussions in critical philosophy of race. This article begins with an evaluation of the typology of non-racialism provided by Rupert (...) class='Hi'>Taylor and the historical study of non-racialism provided by Julie Frederikse, distinguishing different understandings of non-racialism. The second section presents Biko's understanding of non-racialism, arguing that Biko's understanding of which is embedded in his account of Black Consciousness, and not a variant of racial eliminativism. The final section focuses on the striking similarities between understandings of non-racialism and post-racialism using a distinction it introduces between principled and progressive forms of both these terms. Ultimately, this article makes the case for a progressive understanding of post-racialism, which has yet to be articulated and is too easily dismissed in the United States. (shrink)

First published in 1985. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Hegel’s philosophy is so extensive and comprehensive, so complex, in many respects so obscure and difficult, and so little understood, that any exposition offering fresh insight is to be welcomed. Professor Taylor’s has numerous merits. It is detailed, meticulous, painstaking and thorough and, is based, throughout, on an accurate understanding and clear grasp of Hegel’s meaning and aim.

Explanation of and commentary on Hegel’s Logic in English is rare and much needed. The Logic has been given far less attention than the Phenomenology, and such treatment as it has had from such writers as Stace, Findlay, Kaufmann, and Taylor has not always been adequate and has at times been misguided. The expectant reader will, therefore, approach Professor Burbidge’s book with high hopes. These, however, are at once mitigated by his confession that he gives only fragments of a (...) commentary, and, further, his approach is professedly and intentionally subjective and so one-sided. Nevertheless, a fresh look at the Logic is much to be welcomed if it can offer new insights and make Hegel more understandable and more acceptable. But, alas, this book hardly fulfills even the promise of its title. Fragmentary it certainly is, and not only in the sense intended by the author. The commentary is limited to the first major triad of each of the three main divisions of the Logic, omitting the second and the third triads in each case. This is singularly unfortunate because the very nature of the dialectic is such that the outcome always provides the explanatory principle of what precedes: the end is the explanation of the process, as well as the complete and adequate presentation of the prior, partial, and relatively obscure concepts which constitute its moments. Commentary restricted to the first portion of any section, therefore, is liable to miss the real significance of the whole doctrine. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In his seminal 1935 study of the internal senses in medieval2 thought, Harry Austryn Wolfson presented a detailed account of the development of the "classification and terminology" of the Greek, Arabic, Hebrew and Latin traditions on sensory powers which he called, "post-sensationary faculties,"~ that is, powers which are posterior to the five external senses. In explaining the complex development of teachings on the internal senses from Aristotle's texts, Wolfson recounted the Aristotelian understanding of Galen who specifically locates the OHXVOTl'ttKOV or (...) cogitative faculty in the middle ventricle of the brain and John of Damascus whose equally Aristotelian account follows the Stagirite in attributing judgments of goodand bad as well as combination and separation of ideas to the omvoTl'ttKTJ 'lfUXTt or the cogitative soul and to ouxvma or cogitation.4 One of the many fruits of Wolfson's discussion was an explanation of the development of the Avicennian doctrine of estimation as arising"out of a desire to supplement a deficiency which seemed to exist in Aristotle's account of the actual motion of pursuit and avoidance which is observed in both man and animal. "5 With wahm used to describe instinctive behavior consequent upon non-rational animal imagination analogous to human reasoning or deliberation, Wolfson wrote, the Arabic fikr now was tobe associated with imagination and no longer was to be seen as simply the power of combining and separating ideas. "In the case of ouivotcx combined with imagination, it is the combination and separation of images, i.e., the construction out of images of things existent, new composite images of things nonexistent, or the breaking up of images of things existent into images of things nonexistent."6 From this moment on, and not without some foundation in Aristotle's own texts as indicated, fikr/ cogitatio and their related derivative terms are used to characterize human rational powers which are essentially activities involving the bodyand bodily instruments insofar as imagination is necessarily bodily. (shrink)

Originally published between 1924 and 1929 discuss the future of psychology and the break-throughs it could provide for modern medicine. Authors included are E N Bennett, H F Carlill,D F Fraser Harris, M Jaeger and C J Patten.

Hegel’s philosophy is so extensive and comprehensive, so complex, in many respects so obscure and difficult, and so little understood, that any exposition offering fresh insight is to be welcomed. Professor Taylor’s has numerous merits. It is detailed, meticulous, painstaking and thorough and, is based, throughout, on an accurate understanding and clear grasp of Hegel’s meaning and aim.

As hopes that generative linguistics might solve philosophical problems about the mind give way to disillusionment, old problems concerning the relationship between linguistics and philosophy survive unresolved. This collection surveys the historical engagement between the two, and opens up avenues for further reflection. In Part 1 two contrasting views are presented of the interface nowadays called 'philosophy of linguistics '. Part 2 gives a detailed historical survey of the engagement of analytic philosophy with linguistic problems during the present century, and (...) sees the imposition by philosophers of an 'exploratory' model of thinking as a major challenge to the discipline of linguistics. Part 3 poses the problem of whether linguistics is dedicated to describing independently existing linguistic structures or to imposing its own structures on linguistic phenomena. In Part 4 Harris points out some similarities in the way an eminent linguist and an eminent philosopher invoke the analogy between languages and games; while Taylor analyses the rationale of our metalinguistic claims and their relationship to linguistic theorizing. Providing a wide range of views and ideas this book will be of interest to all those interested and involved in the interface of philosophy and linguistics. (shrink)

Explanation of and commentary on Hegel’s Logic in English is rare and much needed. The Logic has been given far less attention than the Phenomenology, and such treatment as it has had from such writers as Stace, Findlay, Kaufmann, and Taylor has not always been adequate and has at times been misguided. The expectant reader will, therefore, approach Professor Burbidge’s book with high hopes. These, however, are at once mitigated by his confession that he gives only fragments of a (...) commentary, and, further, his approach is professedly and intentionally subjective and so one-sided. Nevertheless, a fresh look at the Logic is much to be welcomed if it can offer new insights and make Hegel more understandable and more acceptable. But, alas, this book hardly fulfills even the promise of its title. Fragmentary it certainly is, and not only in the sense intended by the author. The commentary is limited to the first major triad of each of the three main divisions of the Logic, omitting the second and the third triads in each case. This is singularly unfortunate because the very nature of the dialectic is such that the outcome always provides the explanatory principle of what precedes: the end is the explanation of the process, as well as the complete and adequate presentation of the prior, partial, and relatively obscure concepts which constitute its moments. Commentary restricted to the first portion of any section, therefore, is liable to miss the real significance of the whole doctrine. (shrink)